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A Schema-Theoretic View 1 
A Schema-Theoretic View of 
Basic Processes in Reading Comprehension 
. . . to completely analyze what we do when we read would 
almost be the acme of a psychologist's dream for it would be 
to describe very many of the most intricate workings of the 
human mind, as well as to unravel the tangled story of the 
most remarkable specific performance that civilization has 
learned in all its history. (Huey, 1908, p. 8) 
Huey's eloquent statement about the goals of the psychology 
of reading is as relevant today as it was when he wrote it in 
1908. The quotation usually precedes an apology for how little 
we have learned in the past 75 years. We wish to break with that 
tradition and use Huey's statement to introduce an essay in which 
we will try to demonstrate that while we have not fully achieved 
Huey's goal, we have made substantial progress. 
Our task is to characterize basic processes of reading 
comprehension. We will not present a model of the entire reading 
process, beginning with the focusing of the eye on the printed 
page and ending with the encoding of information into long-term 
semantic memory or its subsequent retrieval for purposes of 
demonstrating comprehension to someone in the outer world. 
Instead, we will focus on one aspect of comprehension of 
particular importance to reading comprehension: the issue of how 
the reader's schemata, or knowledge already stored in memory, 
function in the process of interpreting new information and 
A Schema-Theoretic View 2 
allowing it to enter and become a part of the knowledge store. 
Whether we are aware of it or not, it is this interaction of new 
information with old knowledge that we mean when we use the term 
comprehension. To say that one has comprehended a text is to say 
that she has found a mental "home" for the information in the 
text, or else that she has modified an existing mental home in 
order to accommodate that new information. It is precisely this 
interaction between old and new information that we address in 
this chapter. 
Our plan for this paper is straightforward. First, we will 
trace the historical antecedents of schema theory. Then we will 
outline the basic elements of the theory and point out problems 
with current realizations of the theory and possible solutions. 
Next, we will consider the interplay between the abstracted 
knowledge embodied in schemata and memory for particular 
examples. Then we will decompose the comprehension process in 
order to examine components of encoding (attention, 
instantiation, and inference) and retrieval (retrieval plans, 
editing and summarizing, and reconstructive processes). Finally, 
we will evaluate the contributions of schema theory to our 
understanding of the comprehension process and speculate about 
the directions future research should take. 
History of the Notion of a_ Schema 
While Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932) is usually acknowledged 
as the first psychologist to use the term schema in the sense 
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that it is used today, historical precedence must surely be given 
to the Gestalt psychologists. The starting point for Gestalt 
psychology was a paper by Max Wertheimer in 1912 reporting 
research in which Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka served as 
assistants. These three became the principal figures in the 
Gestalt movement. 
The term Gestalt literally means or "shape" or "form." 
Gestalt psychology emphasized holistic properties. It was the 
study of mental organization. The Gestalt movement was a 
reaction against the Zeitgeist at the turn of the century which 
held that perception, thought, and emotion could be resolved into 
elemental sensations. According to Wilhelm Wundt, the dominant 
figure in psychology during that period, the business of 
psychology "was (1) the analysis of conscious processes into 
elements, (2) the determination of the manner of connection of 
these elements, and (3) the determination of their laws of 
connection" (Boring, 1950, p. 333). The popular metaphor was 
that psychology was "mental chemistry." 
T h e insight of the Gestalt psychologists was that the 
properties of a whole experience cannot be inferred from its 
parts. Carrying the mental chemistry metaphor a step further, 
they liked to point out that the molecules of chemical compounds 
have emergent properties that cannot be predicted in a simple 
fashion from the properties of the constituent elements (cf. 
Kohler, 1947, p. 115). 
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The basic principle of Gestalt psychology, called the Law of 
Pragnanz, is that mental organization will always be as good as 
prevailing conditions allow (cf. Koffka, 1935, p. 110), In this 
definition "good" embraces such properties as simplicity, 
regularity, and symmetry. The theory stresses that mental 
organization is "dynamic," which means that the tendency toward 
coherent organization is a spontaneous process that can happen 
without an external goad. 
Gestalt ideas were applied especially to visual perception. 
A notable example, which had a considerable influence on 
subsequent thinking, was Wulf's (1922, translation 1938) research 
> 
on memory for geometric designs. Subjects were asked to make 
drawings that reproduced the designs shortly after exposure, 
after twenty-four hours, and after one week. As the interval 
lengthened, Wulf observed characteristic changes in the 
reproductions that he termed "leveling" and "sharpening." 
Leveling means smoothing an irregularity. Sharpening means 
emphasizing or exaggerating a salient feature. The overall 
effect generally was to "normalize" reproductions. Wulf (1938, 
p. 140) illustrated the process with the following design: 
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Four subjects spoke of this as a "bridge" while another called it 
an "arch." In their reproductions of this figure these subjects 
all lengthened the "supports." Wulf (1938, p. 141) explained his 
results in these terms: 
"In addition to, or even instead of, purely visual data 
there were also general types or schemata in terms of which 
the subject constructed his responses. . . . The schema 
itself becomes with time ever more dominant; visual imagery 
of the original disappears, • • • details contained in the 
original are forgotten and incorrectly reproduced, yet even 
the last reproduction will usually show a steady progress 
towards representation of the type or schema originally 
conceived." 
\ 
According to Bartlett in his classic book Remembering (1932, 
p. 201) the term "schema" refers to "an active organization of 
past reactions, or past experience . . . " The term active was 
intended to emphasize what he saw as the constructive character 
of remembering, which he contrasted with a passive retrieval of 
"fixed and lifeless" memories. "The first notion to get rid of," 
Bartlett wrote (1932, p. 204), "is that memory is primarily or 
literally reduplicative, or reproductive . . . It is with 
remembering as it is with the stroke in a skilled game [of tennis 
or cricket] . . . Every time we make it, it has its own 
characteristics." 
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Though he used phrases such as "mental set," "active 
organization" and "general impression" a great deal, Bartlett was 
never very clear about what he meant by them, other than to 
indicate a top-down influence: 
"an individual does not ordinarily take • • • a situation 
detail by detail and meticulously build up the whole. In 
all ordinary instances he has an overmastering tendency 
simply to get a general impression of the whole; and, on the 
basis of this, he constructs the probable detail. Very 
little of his construction is literally observed . . . But 
it is the sort of construction which serves to justify his 
general impression" (1932, p. 206). 
Bartlett was vague about just how schemata work. For 
example, he said several times that a central idea in his theory 
was "turning around on one's schemata." He apparently meant 
deducing the way the past must have been from one's current 
schema. But he never explicated the idea. Indeed, he admitted, 
"I wish I knew exactly how it was done" (1932, p. 206). 
Bartlett's ideas resembled those of Gestalt psychology and 
he even described research of his own on memory for pictorial 
material that was similar to Wulf's. Nevertheless, there is no 
indication that he was directly influenced by the Gestalt 
tradition. The only Gestalt psychologist that Bartlett cited was 
Kohler, and he in just a passing note that "recent general 
psychological theories are still in a fluid state" (1932, p. 
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186), At least one of the major Gestalt psychologists was aware 
of Bartlett's work. In Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Koffka 
(1935, p. 519) complained that he found Bartlett difficult to 
understand but acknowledged that there was "a great affinity 
between Bartlett's theory of memory and our own." 
With respect to empirical research, Bartlett is best 
remembered for his study of the recall of the North American 
Indian folk tale The War of the Ghosts. He reported that, 
especially after a long interval, subjects' reproductions became 
simplified and stereotyped. Details that "fit in with a 
subject's preformed interests and tendencies" (1932, p. 93) were 
recalled. Other details were either omitted or "rationalized by 
linking them together and so rendering them apparently coherent, 
or linking given detail with detail not actually present . . . " 
(p. 94). As time passed, elaborations, importations, and 
inventions appeared in subjects' reproductions with increasing 
frequency. Usually these intrusions could be seen as 
contributing to the subject's rationalization of the text. 
We turn now to a major figure in the recent history of 
r. 
education and psychology, David P . Ausubel. He has had a direct 
influence on the thinking of the current generation of 
educational researcher workers, including the present authors. 
His thinking, in turn, bears resemblances to that of Bartlett, 
the Gestalt psychologists and, perhaps even more, to 19th century 
figures such as Herbart, as Barnes and Clawson (1975) have 
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pointed out. However, Ausubel himself has emphatically denied 
such intellectual debts (1978, p. 253). It seems only fair to 
conclude that he reinvented the ideas associated with his name 
and gave them a distinctive flourish. 
According to Ausubel (1963; Ausubel & Robinson, 1969), in 
meaningful learning already-known general ideas "subsume" or 
"anchor" the new particular propositions found in texts. This 
happens only when the existing ideas are stable, clear, 
discriminable from other ideas, and directly relevant to the to-
be-understood propositions. The reader has to be aware of which 
aspects of his knowledge are relevant. Sometimes this will be 
obvious. Sometimes the text will be explicit. When neither of 
these conditions holds or the reader's grasp of the required 
knowledge is shaky, an "advance organizer" may be prescribed. An 
advance organizer is a statement written in abstract, inclusive 
terms deliberately introduced before a text and intended to 
provide a conceptual bridge between what the reader already knows 
and the propositions in the text that it is hoped he will 
understand and learn. 
Ausubel has not called his theory a schema theory but it 
clearly is. Ausubel's own research and the research of those 
inspired by him has dealt mainly with advance organizers, which 
have proved to have facilitative effects (Mayer, 1979; Luiten, 
A m e s , & Ackerson, 1980). 
Among educators, something like schema theory has driven 
conceptions about reading. Take, for instance, Huey's (1908) 
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conclusion about whether we read letter by letter or in larger 
chunks: 
"So it is clear that the larger the amount read during a 
reading pause, the more inevitably must the reading be by 
suggestion and inference from clews of whatsoever kind, 
internal or external. In reading, the deficient picture is 
filled in, retouched, by the mind, and the page is thus made 
to present the familiar appearance of completeness in its 
details which we suppose to exist in the actual page (p. 
68)." 
Implicit, if not explicit, in the philosophy of Francis Parker 
when he ran the laboratory school at the University of Chicago at 
the turn of the last century was the importance of building 
knowledge structures through experience as a prerequisite to 
reading (see Mathews, 1966). Ernest Horn, famous for his work in 
spelling, recognized the active contribution of the reader: 
"(The author] does not really convey ideas to the reader; he 
merely stimulates him to construct them out of his own 
experience. If the concept is . . . new to the reader, its 
construction more nearly approaches problem solving than simple 
association" (Horn, 1937). And, of course, William S. Gray 
recognized, both in his professional writing (1948) and in his 
suggestions for teachers in basal reader manuals (1928, 1945, 
1954, 1960), the necessity of engaging children's prior knowledge 
before reading. 
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But the full development of schema theory as a model for 
representing how knowledge is stored in human memory had to await 
the revolution in our conception of how humans process 
information spurred by the thinking of computer scientists doing 
simulations of human cognition (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Winograd, 
1976). Hence it was in the late 1970s that ambitious statements 
of schema theories began to emerge (Schank & Abelson, 1977; 
Rumelhart, 1980) and to be applied to entities like stories (e.g. 
Rumelhart, 1975; Stein & Glenn, 1977; Mandler & Johnson, 1977) 
and processes like reading (see Anderson, 1977, 1978; Adams & 
Collins, 1979). Concurrently, schema-theoretic notions became 
the driving force behind empirical investigations of basic 
processes in reading. Much of this research is described later 
in this chapter. First, however, we attempt to elucidate schema 
theory as a model of human knowledge. 
Some Elements of Schema Theory 
A schema is an abstract knowledge structure. A schema is 
# 
abstract in the sense that it summarizes what is known about a 
variety of cases that differ in many particulars. An important 
theoretical puzzle is to determine just how much and what sort of 
knowledge is abstracted and how much remains tied to knowledge of 
specific instances. A schema is structured in the sense that it 
represents the relationships among its component parts. The 
theoretical issue is to specify the set of relationships needed 
for a general analysis of knowledge. The overriding challenge 
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for the theorist is to specify the form and substance of schemata 
and the processes by which the knowledge embodied in schemata is 
used. 
We will hang our discussion of these issues on a concrete 
case, the SHIP CHRISTENING schema. A possible representation of 
this schema is diagramed in Figure 1. If, for the sake of the 
argument, one takes this as a serious attempt to represent the 
t 
average person's knowledge of ship christening, what does it say 
and what follows from it? 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
Figure 1 says that the typical person's knowledge of ship 
christening can be analyzed into six parts: that it is done to 
bless a ship, that it normallly takes places in a dry dock, and 
so on. In the jargon of schema theory, these parts are called 
"nodes," "variables," or"slots." When the schema gets activated 
and is used to interpret some event, the slots are "instantiated" 
with particular information. 
There are constraints on the information with which a slot 
can be instantiated. Presumably, for instance, the <celebrity> 
slot could be instantiated with a congressman, the husband or 
wife of a governor, the Secretary of Defense, or the Prince of 
Wales, but not a garbage collector or bar maid. 
Suppose you read in the newspaper that, 
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Queen Elizabeth participated in a long-delayed ceremony 
in Clydebank, Scotland yesterday. While there is still 
bitterness here following the protracted strike, on this 
occasion a crowd of shipyard workers numbering in the 
hundreds joined dignitaries in cheering as the HMS Pinafore 
slipped into the water. 
It is the generally good fit of most of this information 
with the SHIP CHRISTENING schema that provides the confidence 
that (part of) the message has been comprehended. In particular, 
Queen Elizabeth fits the <celebrity> slot, the fact that 
Clydebank is a well-known ship building port and that shipyard 
workers are involved is consistent with the <dry dock> slot, the 
HMS Pinafore is obviously a ship and the information that it 
"slipped into the water" is consistent with the <just before 
i 
launching> slot. Therefore, the ceremony mentioned is probably a 
ship christening. No mention is made of a bottle of champagne 
being broken on the ship's bow, but this "default" inference is 
easily made. 
The foregoing informal treatment of the process of schema 
"activation" can be made more precise. Assume that words 
mentioning any component of a schema have a certain probability 
of bringing to mind the schema as a whole. Assume also that once 
the schema is activated there is a certain probability of being 
reminded of each of the other parts. It is not necessary to 
assume that the likelihood that a part will remind a person of 
» 
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the whole schema is the same as the likelihood that the schema 
will remind the person of that part. It seems likely, for 
example, that a person's SHIP CHRISTENING schema is more likely 
to activate the component concept of a celebrity than the mention 
of a celebrity is to activate the schema. The reason is that 
<celebrity> is a component of many schemata and SHIP CHRISTENING 
is not very prominent among them; therefore, the probability that 
words about a celebrity will activate SHIP CHRISTENING is low. 
Some components of a schema are particularly salient; that 
is to say, words mentioning the component have a high probability 
of bringing to mind the schema and only that schema and, 
therefore, these words have great rdiagnostic value for the 
reader. One would suppose, for example, that words to the effect 
that a bottle was broken on the bow of a ship would be extremely 
likely to remind a person of ship christening. 
A final assumption in this simple model of schema activation 
is that when two or more components of a schema are mentioned the 
aggregate probability of the whole schema being activated is a 
function of the sum of the probabilities that the individual 
components will activate the schema. 
Ross and Bower (1981) worked out a formal, mathematical 
version of the schema activation theory that has just been 
outlined and subjected it to experimental test. In one of their 
experiments subjects studied 80 sets of four words, each related 
to a more or less obvious schema. For instance, one set was 
"driver," "trap," "rough," and "handicap," which relate to a GOLF 
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schema. Another set was "princess," "mouth," "hold," and "dial," 
which relate to a TELEPHONE schema. After studying the word 
sets, subjects attempted to recall the words given one or two 
words from each set as a cue. The schema model gave a good 
account of the recall patterns observed in this and two other 
experiments. In fact it did better than a model based on S-R 
learning theory and traditional associationism. 
To get a feeling for how a model of schema activation of 
this type might work with text, consider the following two 
sentences: 
Princess Anne broke the bottle on the ship. 
The waitress broke the bottle on the ship. 
In the first case the <celebrity> slot as well as the <ship> and 
<bottle breaking> slots are matched and a ship christening 
interpretation is invited. If there is any hiatus over the end 
of the first sentence, it can be treated as elliptical for "broke 
the bottle on the bow of the ship." For most people the second 
sentence does not suggest a ship christening but instead, 
perhaps, a scene in the ship's dining room. This intuition is 
consistent with the schema activation model because a waitress 
will not fit in the <celebrity> slot and thus there is less 
evidence for a ship christening interpretation. 
The simple model we are considering is likely to fail with 
the following sentence, though: 
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During the ceremony on the ship, Prince Charles took a 
swig from the bottle of champagne* 
Here many slots in the schema are matched and the model cannot 
resist predicting activation of the SHIP CHRISTENING schema. How 
could the model be made smarter so that, like a person, it would 
not come to this conclusion? 
First, consider a nonsolution. As a general rule people are 
unlikely to include in their schemata knowledge of the form, "in 
a ship christening the ceremony does not take place on board the 
ship" and "the celebrity does not drink from the bottle of 
champagne." The problem is that there are infinitely many things 
that are not true of any given type of event. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that what is not true of a type of event is 
"directly stored" only in special circumstances. For instance, 
one might store that a warbler does not have a thick beak if this 
is the critical feature that distinguishes it from the otherwise 
very similar song sparrow. 
In general, though, determining what is not true requires an 
inference from what is true or is believed to be true. In the 
case of the Prince Charles sentence, the inference chain might 
look like the following: 
1. A ship christening takes place on a platform on the dock 
next to the bow of the ship (from stored knowledge). 
2 . The celebrity playing the key role in the ceremony stands 
4T 
on this platform (from stored knowledge). 
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3. If Prince Charles were the celebrity taking the principal 
part in a ship christening ceremony, then he would have been 
standing on this platform (inference). 
4 . A platform on the dock next to the bow of a ship is not 
on the ship (inference). 
5 . During the ceremony, Prince Charles was on the ship 
(given in to-be-interpreted sentence). 
6 . During the ceremony, Prince Charles was not on a platform 
used for ship christening (inference). 
7 . The ceremony in which Prince Charles was participating 
was not a ship christening (inference). 
Converging evidence that the sentence is not about a ship 
christening might come from anaylsis of the fact that Prince 
Charles took a swig of the champagne. In this case, the reader 
might make a lack-of-knowledge inference (Collins, 1978), which 
would work something like the following: 
1. I (the reader) do not have stored the information that 
the celebrity takes a swig from the bottle of champagne during a 
ship christening (computation based on stored knowledge). 
2. I have many facts stored about ship christenings that are 
at the same level of detail as the information that the celebrity 
takes a swig from the bottle (computation based on stored 
knowledge). 
3. If the celebrity's taking a drink from the bottle were a 
part of a ship christening, I would probably know that fact 
(inference). 
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4. A ceremony during which the celebrity takes a drink from 
a bottle of champagne is probably not a ship christening 
(inference). 
5. Prince Charles took a swig from a bottle of champagne 
(from the. to-be-interpreted sentence). 
6. The ceremony in which Prince Charles is participating is 
probably not a ship christening (inference). 
Plainly, the representation of the SHIP CHRISTENING schema 
diagramed in Figure 1 is not adequate to support the chains of 
inference required to deal with the Prince Charles sentence. One 
problem is that some pieces of knowledge, such as that the 
christening takes place on a platform under the bow of the ship, 
are missing. But this is the least of the problems with the 
representation. 
The fundamental problem with the representation is that it 
does not make explicit the temporal, causal, spatial, part-whole, 
and member-set relations among the components of a ship 
christening. For instance, the representation does not include 
the information that it is the celebrity who breaks the bottle on 
the bow of the ship and that the reason for the breaking of the 
bottle is to bless the ship. Figure 2 shows some of the 
relationships among these components. Such relational knowledge 
is necessary for inferencing and, as we have just seen, 
i 
V 
inferencing can be necessary to get the right schema activated. 
I 
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Insert Figure 2 about here. 
Because the representation of the SHIP CHRISTENING shema 
portrayed in Figure 1 is impoverished, the relationships among 
the parts and between the parts and the whole are arbitrary and 
unmotivated. It can be predicted with some confidence on the 
basis of accumulated experimental evidence that a person who 
possessed the knowledge, and only the knowledge, represented in 
Figure 1 would not only have trouble making perspicuous 
inferences but also (a) would have trouble learning similarly 
arbitrary additional facts about ship christening, (b) would be 
vulnerable to confusions when attempting to recall and use facts 
about ship christening, (c) would be relatively slow to retrieve 
even well-known facts. Each of the preceding problems would grow 
more severe as the number of arbitrarily-related facts that were 
known increased. 
Every schema theorist has emphasized the nonarbitrary nature 
of knowledge. Notably, John Bransford (e.g. 1983) has stressed 
that "seeing the significance" of the parts in terms of the 
whole is the sine qua non of a schema-theoretic view of 
comprehension. In one of a number of experiments that Bransford 
and his colleagues have done which provide evidence for this 
claim, Stein and Bransford (1979) found that subjects were 
slightly worse at recalling core sentences, such as, 
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The fat man read the sign, 
when the sentences were arbitrarily elaborated, as in, 
The fat man read the sign that was two feet high. 
In contrast, recall of the core sentences improved substantially 
when the core sentences were "precisely elaborated," as in, 
The fat man read the sign warning of the thin ice. 
A precise elaboration clarified the significance of the concepts 
in the core sentence and indicated how the concepts fit together. 
Smith, Adams, and Schorr (1978; see also Clifton & 
Slowiaczek, 1981 and Reder & Anderson, 1980) have presented some 
strong evidence showing the benefits of integrating otherwise 
arbitrary information under the aegis of a schema. Subjects 
learned pairs of apparently unrelated propositions attributed to 
a member of some profession. For instance, 
The banker broke the bottle. 
The banker did not delay the trip. 
Then a third proposition was learned that either allowed the 
subject to integrate the three sentences in terms of a common 
schema or which was unintegratable with the other two sentences, 
as is illustrated below: 
The banker was chosen to christen the ship. 
The banker was asked to address the crowd. 
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Subjects required fewer study opportunities to learn the third 
sentence when it was readily integratable than when it was 
unintegratable. Most interesting was the fact that after all of 
the sentences had been learned to a high criterion of mastery, it 
took subjects longer to verify that sentences from the 
unintegratable sets were ones they had seen. 
The explanation for this subtle finding is that in an 
unintegrated set all of the propositions fan out from a single 
common node representing, for instance, "the banker." This means 
that each new proposition added to the set increases the burden 
of memory search and verification and, therefore, causes an 
increase in memory search time called the "fanning effect" 
(J. Anderson, 1976). In contrast,« the interconnections among the 
concepts in integrated sets facilitate retrieval and 
verification; thus, adding a proposition to an integrated set 
causes little or no increase in search time. 
Most discussions of schema theory have emphasized the use 
of schemata to assimilate information. Here, instead, we will 
deal with how a schema may be modified to accommodate new 
information. Obviously, a person may modify a schema from being 
told new information. For instance, a person might add to his or 
her SHIP CHRISTENING schema upon being informed that the platform 
on which the ceremony takes place is typically draped with 
bunting displaying the national colors. 
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Presumably a logical person will check to make sure new 
• 
information is consistent with the information already stored 
and, if it is not, will either reject the new information or 
modify the old. Presumably a careful person will evaluate 
whether the source of new information is creditable or the 
evidence is persuasive before changing a schema." Lipson (1982) 
has evidence that suggests that even young readers will reject 
text information if it is inconsistent with an already possessed 
interpretation that they believe to be correct. 
A primary source of data for schema change and development 
is experience with particular cases. In a process that is still 
not well-understood, even though thinkers have wrestled with how 
it happens since the time of the ancient Greeks, people make/ 
inductive generalizations based on perceptible or functional 
features or patterns of particular cases. Traditional 
psychological theories envisioned a slow, grinding process of 
generalization, so slow and uncertain that the wonder was that 
anyone acquired the knowledge of a five-year-old. Current 
theories envision powerful inferential heuristics and 
generalization from a few cases or even a single case. Now the 
wonder is how people avoid filling their heads with all sorts of 
inaccurate and farfetched beliefs. How, for instance, is the 
nonexpert in ship christening, upon reading the newspaper 
describing the putative christening of the HMS Pinafore, to be 
restrained from inferring that the purpose of a ship christening 
is to celebrate the end of a labor dispute? 
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We turn now to the question of the relationship between the 
knowledge embodied in schemata and knowledge of particular 
scenes, happenings, or messages. An attractive theory is that a 
schema includes just the propositions that are true of every 
member of a class. For instance, a BIRD schema may be supposed 
to include the information that birds lay eggs, have feathers, 
have wings, and fly, that the wings enable flying, and so on, 
Collins and Quillian (1968) proposed the interesting 
additional assumption that for reasons of "cognitive economy" 
propositions about the general case are not included in the 
representation for particular cases. So the representation for a 
robin is supposed to include propositions about distinctive 
features of robins, such that they have red breasts, but not that 
they fly or lay eggs. These facts can be deduced from the fact 
that a robin is a bird and that a robin has any property ascribed 
to all birds. Similarly, the bird representation does not 
directly include the information that birds breathe, since birds 
are animals and breathing is a property of all animals. 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
Collins and Quillian theorized that knowledge is organized 
in semantic networks that permit graphical representations of the 
type illustrated in Figure 3. Notice that there is an 
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increasingly long path in the network from the canary node to the 
information (or predicate) in each of the following sentences: 
Canaries are yellow. 
Canaries lay eggs. 
Canaries can breathe. 
It is a straightforward predictioi^ that the greater the distance 
in the network that must be traversed to find the stored 
information, the longer it will take to verify the proposition. 
This prediction has been confirmed many times in many 
laboratories. 
The appeal of the cognitive economy hypothesis is that, 
while'long-term human memory capacity is no doubt very large, it 
is not infinite. People could save a lot of memory space if they 
stored information at the most inclusive possible levels in their 
knowledge representations. Furthermore, most people have 
probably never seen a canary lay an egg or a giant condor fly, so 
there is little reason to suppose that this information would be 
directly stored in their canary or condor representations. 
But what about the information that a robin can fly? Surely 
the typical person has seen countless flying robins. It would be 
an odd theory of human information processing that could explain 
why this fact was not stored directly in a person's robin 
representation. To do so would require postulating a mental 
librarian who, when the senses return information about flying 
robins, steadfastly files it on a higher shelf. 
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Current theories of concepts posit that the information 
represented in specific concepts such as robin overlap with the 
information in general concepts such as bird (Smith & Medin, 
1981). In fact, robin is a "good" example of a bird since the 
overlap is large, while penguin is a "poor" example because the 
overlap is small. 
What is the best way in a theory of knowledge 
representations to cope with exceptional cases? In the first 
place, people probably place an implicit hedge on all the facts 
they think they know, of the form "this proposition is true in 
only normal states of the world." At the very least such a 
hedge helps fend off philosophers who ask questions like, "If a 
dog _is a four-legged animal, what is a creature that has three 
legs but is otherwise a dog?" 
The real theoretical problem, however, is not with abnormal 
cases such as dogs with three legs and hens that do not lay eggs, 
but with more mundane exceptions: Most birds fly, however some 
such as penguins do not. Canaries are often domesticated, 
however many more are wild. Cups tend to be used to hold 
liquids, but they can be used to hold solids. 
The classical issue in concept analysis was to specify the 
features that were individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
before a thing could rightly be called an instance of a concept. 
For example, following Katz (1972), some of the necessary 
features of bachelor are said to be <male>, <adult>, <human>, and 
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<unmarried>. If a feature is necessary, then all instances of 
the concept display that feature. However, a feature that all 
instances possess may not be a necessary one. It may be safe to 
assume that every bachelor has a nose, but <having a nose> is not 
a necessary feature. If an unmarried, adult, human male without 
a nose did turn up, no one would be reluctant to call him a 
bachelor. In contrast, calling a married man a bachelor would be 
regarded as a non sequitor (or a joke or a metaphor). Thus, 
<having a nose) is a characteristic feature while <unmarried> is 
a necessary feature, even though by hypothesis every bachelor 
displays both features. 
The very idea that concepts or schemata (there is no 
principled distinction between the two) have necessary features 
has come under lethal attack in recent years. Wittgenstein 
(1953) noticed that it can be difficult, if not impossible, to 
specify the necessary features of most ordinary concepts. His 
famous analysis of games suggested that there are no features 
common to all games and that the relationship among games is most 
aptly characterized as one of "family resemblance." Putnam 
(1975; see also, Kripke, 1972) has shown that features of 
ordinary concepts that at first glance might seem to be necessary 
are really only characteristic. For instance, <precious> cannot 
be a necessary feature of gold because gold would no longer be 
precious if large quantities of it were discovered somewhere. 
If there are few ordinary concepts with clearly necessary 
features and, indeed, not many with characteristic features true 
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of all cases, the basis for positing that knowledge consists of 
abstract summaries of particular cases begins to erode. And this 
leads one to consider granting a greater role to memories for 
particular cases. It could be that much that passes for general 
knowledge is actually derived as needed by retrieving specific 
cases and making calculations based on what is known about them. 
Let's do a thought experiment. What kind of nests do birds 
build? Try to pause before reading on and notice how your mind 
works as you answer this question. 
Probably you answered the question by thinking of particular 
types of birds and then trying to remember occassions when you 
saw the nests of these birds, either in nature or in books. 
Probably you began your search with a familiar, typical bird, 
such as a robin. If you know quite a bit about birds, your 
search probably turned up diverse kinds of nests such as those of 
ducks, Baltimore orioles, barn swallows, and bald eagles. 
Your intuitions were no doubt consistent with the 
hypothesized process of searching memories of specific cases. 
Experimental evidence, which does not rely on intuition, is also 
consistent with the hypothesized process. Walker (1975) asked 
subjects to accept or reject as quickly as possible propositions 
about a wide variety of things with quantifiable dimensions, such 
as the following: 
A large dog could weigh 12 pounds. 
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Subjects quickly rejected this proposition and also quickly 
rejected sentences that ascribed an extremely heavy weight, such 
as 400 pounds, to a large dog. Furthermore, subjects quickly 
accepted statements ascribing a weight rated as typical of a 
large dog, such as 100 pounds. However, subjects were slow to 
accept or reject weights rated at the boundries of a large dog, 
say 40 to 60 pounds. 
It is very difficult to accommodate Walker's findings to a 
theory that says that people have directly stored as part of 
their general concept of a large dog that large dogs weigh from, 
say, 51 to 140 pounds. Such a theory would have to predict that 
people would be equally fast at accepting any weight between 51 
and 140 pounds and equally fast at rejecting any weight outside 
this range. Moreover, the theory that people directly store as 
part of their knowledge of a class of objects generalizations 
about the range on each dimension along which the objects can be 
classified is highly implausible. Objects vary in innumberable 
dimensions. If a person has stored the range of weights of large 
dogs, why not the widths of their ears and the lengths of their 
tails? The more plausible and parsimonious theory, then, is that 
people make use of knowledge of specific cases in calculations 
such as the foregoing. 
It is well-established that words can have different « 
meanings in different contexts, even when the words are being 
used in the same sense (Anderson, Pichert, Schallert, Stevens, & 
Trollip, 1976; Anderson & Shiffrin, 1980). This fact poses a 
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grave problem for any theory along the lines that the meaning of 
a compound is the product of the general meanings of the 
constituent words. This conventional theory does work in some 
cases. For instance, it seems to work in the case of the 
compound, red dress. The dress can be construed as having a 
typical shade of red. 
Now consider the following compounds, however: red 
strawberry, red barn, red sunset, and red hair. The red 
visualized is different in each of these cases, as Halff, Ortony, 
and Anderson (1977) have demonstrated empirically. To explain 
this effect, we propose that specific memories of, for instance, 
red hair are retrieved and the range of hues calculated. We 
further suggest that the hue of the compound is predicted on the 
basis of the generic concept of red and the generic concept of 
the object only when the person has not experienced this 
combination before or when an indeterminate range of hues is 
possible. 
Stating the foregoing theory in general form, word meanings 
are context sensitive because people treat words and phrases as 
instructions to locate in memory specific examples. The sense 
and reference of the terms are then refined on the basis of these 
examples. When specific examples representing the intersection 
of the sets of examples signified by the terms cannot be located, 
then the default inference of a typical meaning is made based on 
the general schemata that the terms represent. 
I 
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How are the phrases "a particular case" and "a specific 
example" to be interpreted? A robin is a specific example of a 
bird, but notice that ROBIN is itself an abstracted and generic 
schema. Still more specific is the-robin-I-saw-nesting-in-the-
hawthorne-tree-outside-my-front-door-this-morning. Following 
Smith and Medin (1981), we assume that people have knowledge 
represented at various levels of specificity. Nothing about our 
thinking requires people always to get back to memories of cases 
experienced at a particular moment in time and space. 
In summary, the three main points of this section were that 
an adequate account of the structure of schemata will include 
information about the relationships among components, that a 
complete theory of schema activation will include a major role 
for inference, and that during language comprehension people 
probably rely on knowledge of particular cases as well as 
abstract and general schemata. 
Schemata and Inference 
One of the key processes in a schema-theoretic account of 
cognitive processing is inferencing. In choosing to highlight 
inferences in a special section, we run the risk of suggesting 
that inferencing occupies some special stage in the comprehension 
process. We assert no such claim; in fact, we will demonstrate 
that inferences can occur either at the time of initial encoding 
of text information into memory or at the time that information 
is retrieved from memory. The reason for devoting a special 
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section to inferences is to acknowledge their centrality to the 
overall process of comprehension. At least four kinds of 
inference can be identified in reading comprehension. 
1. Inferences may be involved in the process of deciding 
what schema among many should be called into play in order to 
comprehend a text. It is rarely the case when reading that one 
is told directly what schema to use. Subtle cues are usually 
picked up from the text that allow schema selection. For 
example, to read a lead sentence from a newspaper article 
indicating that Princess Anne took part in a ceremony involving a 
new ship may provide sufficient evidence to allow a reader to 
infer that a SHIP CHRISTENING schema should be invoked. 
2. Inference is also involved in the process of 
instantiating slots within a selected schema. A reader typically 
makes inference when deciding that a particular character or item 
mentioned in a story is intended to fill a particular slot. 
Consider the earlier example about Queen Elizabeth in Clydebank. 
There was nothing explicitly stated in the text to tell the 
reader that Queen Elizabeth should fill the <celebrity> slot. 
The reader who decides she should fill that slot has made the 
inference that she, amongst all the characters and items in the 
text, is the most likely candidate to fill that slot. 
Furthermore a reader may fill a particular slot in a schema by 
assigning default values in the absence of any specifically 
substantiating information in the text. Again using the SHIP 
CHRISTENING example, deciding that a bottle of champagne was used 
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is an example of such a default inference. It should be stressed 
that filling slots by default is not a rare event. Rather, it is 
a routine aspect of the ongoing process of comprehension. 
Writers rely on the fact that there is a considerable amount of 
knowledge that they share with their audience. When it can be W 
assumed that their audience will be able to accurately infer what 
shared knowledge has been omitted, writers will usually omit it 
(Clark & Haviland, 1977; Grice, 1975). It is this process of 
filling slots by default that most people think of when they are 
told that an inference has been made. 
There is a fourth kind of inference: it involves drawing a 
conclusive based upon lack of knowledge. It has the logic, "If X 
were true, I would know it were true. Since I do not know X to 
be true, it is probably false." Recall the earlier example in 
which this sort of inference was involved in deciding that since 
Prince Charles took a swig of champagne from the bottle, he must 
not be participating in a ship christening. 
One paradigm of studies designed to investigate schema 
selection inferences involves presenting students with an 
ambiguous text, written so as to permit two or more 
interpretations, and later asking them to recall it. Then on the 
basis of theme-revealing intrusions into subjects
1
 recall 
protocols, one can infer the schema that a given reader selected 
to provide the best account of the data in the text. 
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The paradigm is illustrated in a study by Anderson, 
Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977), who presented college 
students with two texts. One text permitted the interpretation 
of a prisoner planning his escape from a cell or that of a 
wrestler trying to get out of his opponent's hold. The second 
permitted the interpretation of four people getting together to 
play cards or that of a quartet about to begin their weekly music 
practice. Physical education majors and music majors tended to 
select the specialized schema (wrestling or quartet) for only 
that passage consistent with their experience, selecting the more 
common schema (prison or cards) for the other passage. The study 
suggests these conclusions: (a) schema selection is often based 
upon inference, (b) the schema one selects influences the amount 
and nature of recall, and (c) once a schema has been selected, 
even by inference, it will drive other inferences, particularly, 
slot-filling inferences (see section on Schemata and 
Remembering)• 
Evidence for the second kind of inference, using a schema 
already selected to guide the instantiation of slots within the 
schema comes from a slightly different research paradigm. 
Subjects are given a passage written in language so general and 
vague that it is difficult to remember by itself, such as this 
one (used by Dooling & Lachman, 1971, and Bransford & Johnson, 
1972): 
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The procedure is actually quite simple. First, you 
arrange the items into different groups. Of course one pile 
may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If 
you have to go somewhere else due to lack of facilities that 
is the next step; otherwise, you are pretty well set. It is 
important not to overdo things. That is, it is better to do 
too few things at once than too many. In the short run this 
may not seem important but complications can easily arise. 
A mistake can be expensive as well. At first, the whole 
procedure will seem complicated. Soon, however, it will 
become just another facet of life. It is difficult to 
foresee any end to the necessity for this task in the 
immediate future, but then, one never can tell. After the 
procedure is completed one arranges the materials into 
different groups again. Then they can be put into their 
appropriate places. Eventually they will be used once more 
and the whole cycle will then have to be repeated. However, 
that is part of life. 
Some subjects are given the title, Washing Clothes, before 
they read the passage, some after, others not at all. Passage 
recall is enhanced only for the condition in which subjects are 
given the title before reading. Without a title, which allows 
subjects to envoke a schema, a reader cannot decide what to do 
with the information in the text. Once a reader is able to 
activate her WASHING CLOTHES schema, however, even the vague 
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terms in the text can be matched with the appropriate slots (e.g. 
"somewhere else" = laundromat). Hence memory for the text is 
improved. Variations on this paradigm have used disambiuating 
pictures (Bransford & Johnson, 1972) or names of historical 
characters (Dooling & Lachman, 1971). The broader point to be 
made is that even normal texts, with no intentional ambiguity, 
are rarely completely clear about what text items ought to 
instantiate which slots within the schema that has been selected; 
usually the reader herself has to decide, for example, which 
character is the heroine or why someone performed a particular 
act. 
The third type of inference, using a selected schema to fill 
important slots by assigning a default value, is, as we have 
said, the normal sense of what we mean when we say someone has 
drawn an inference. And it is this type of inference that has 
been studied most often, particularly developmentally. The 
developmental research is ambivalent concerning precisely what 
accounts for the observed growth across age in the sheer number 
of inferences readers are able to draw. The work of Paris and 
his colleagues (e.g. Paris & Upton, 1976; Paris & Lindauer, 1976) 
suggests that younger children are simply not predisposed to draw 
inferences spontaneously. They found that five-year-olds were 
less able to infer the implied instrument in sentences like, "The 
man dug a hole," than were eight-year-olds. However, when the 
five-year-olds were told to act out the action in the sentence as 
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they heard it, they were just as able as the eight-year-olds to 
infer the instrument in response to a later probe. 
An alternative, although not mutually-exclusive, argument is 
that age-related growth in inference ability is really a 
difference in the growth of knowledge available for drawing 
inferences. Omanson, Warren, and Trabasso (1978) concluded that 
it was available prior knowledge, not differences in memory 
capacity or control mechanisms that accounted for differences in 
the quantity of inferences drawn by eight- versus five-year-olds. 
Pearson, Hansen, and Gordon (1979) found that differences in 
prior knowledge of the topic accounted for large differences in 
children's ability to answer inferential questions but only for 
very modest differences in literal questions. Nicholson and 
Imlach (1981) have reported even more convincing evidence for the 
influence of knowledge on slot-filling inferences. They found 
that when children were given texts about familiar topics they 
often resorted to prior knowledge to answer inference questions 
even when the text provided explicit information that could have 
been useti. 
Regarding the fourth type of inference, the lack of 
knowledge inference, only anecdotal case study data are currently 
available to evaluate the role and frequency of this sort of 
inference. However, Collins (1978) does provide numerous 
examples of questions that it would appear that readers could 
answer only by invoking lack of knowledge inferences. One point 
about them: they seem to be made primarily at the point of 
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retrieval or when an interrogator (teacher or experimenter) 
imposes a task upon the reader demanding such reasoning. Unlike 
default inferences, for example, they may not be made routinely 
during the ongoing comprehension process. 
Two important questions about inferences that any good 
theory of comprehension will have to deal with are (1) Which 
inferences, among the indefinitely large number that could be 
made, will a reader make during comprehension? and (2) When do 
readers make inferences, at the time of initial encoding of 
information into memory or at the time of retrieval? 
Regarding the first question, the best evidence comes from a 
study by Goetz (1979). Goetz created alternative texts in which 
a target piece of information was either essential or unessential 
to understanding a story, and was either explicitly stated in the 
text or only implied by the information in the text. He then 
measured the probability that the target information would be 
recognized (Experiment 1) or recalled (Experiment 2) as a 
function of explicitness and importance. He found that 
importance was a good predictor of both the probability that that 
the implied information would be recognized and the probability 
that it would be recalled. Interestingly, however, when the 
target information was stated explicitly, importance predicted 
recall but not recognition. Goetz*s findings are significant 
because they provide insight into constraints on an otherwise 
unwieldy process. Without some criterion for deciding which 
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inferences are to be made, there is no principled way for a 
theory to explain how the inference mechanism is stopped from 
churning out countless elaborations of the text. 
The issue of when inferences are made, during encoding or 
retrieval, has a checkered experimental history. The usual 
paradigm for determining the locus of inferences is to give 
subjects a passage to read and to later test their recognition 
latency for information that was directly stated in the text in 
comparison to that which was only implied. Equivalent 
recognition latencies imply that the inferences must have been 
made during encoding; longer latencies for inferences imply that 
they must have been computed at the point of retrieval. e 
Kintsch (1974) reported three studies in which he found a 
shorter times for explicitly stated information only when the 
recognition test was given immediately; with delays of either 20 
minutes or 48 hours, there were no differences in the recognition 
latencies for explicit and implicit information. Singer (1976, 
1977, 1979a, 1979b), on the other hand, has consistently found 
shorter latencies for explicit information. However, in a more 
recent experiment, Singer (1980) found that importance, as 
indexed by how crucial the inference was to maintaining the 
coherence of the text, is a moderating factor. Necessary 
inferences were recognized as rapidly as explicit information. 
Both of these types were recognized about 245 milliseconds more 
rapidly than plausible but unnecessary inferences. 
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In summary, it is somewhat ironic that in order to fulfill 
the basic goal of creating a model of the meaning of a text that 
accounts for all the explicit information, or as much of it as is 
possible, interpretations must be made that often go well beyond 
the text itself. Current evidence suggests that inferences 
important for a coherent understanding of of the text will be 
made at the time the text is read. Other inferences will be 
drawn only when circumstances demand. 
Schemata and the Allocation of Attention 
Perhaps the most pervasive and consistent finding of 
research on discourse is that important text elements are more 
likely to be learned and remembered than less important elements. 
One attractive theory to explain this fact is that readers 
selectively attend to important elements. The following is a 
simple version of this theory: 
t 1. The schema to which the text is being assimilated, 
already-processed text information, and an analysis of task 
demands provide a gauge for judging the importance of upcoming 
text elements. 
2. As it is encountered each text element is processed to 
some minimum level and then graded for importance. 
3. Extra attention is devoted to elements that surpass a 
criterion of importance. 
4 . Because of the extra attention they receive, important 
text elements are learned better; and, because they are learned 
better, these text elements are also remembered better. 
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Recently there have been several attempts to test a 
selective attention model such as the foregoing by directly 
measuring indicators of amount of attention. It should be 
emphasized that attention is a hypothetical construct that may be 
imperfectly reflected in any operational measure (see Kahneman, 
1973). One index that has commonsense appeal, as well as a 
substantial history of use in experimental research, is the 
amount of time a subject takes to complete a task or a segment of 
a task. Other measures that have been argued to reflect aspects 
of attention include eye fixations, pupil dilation, brain waves, 
and latency of response to a secondary task probe. 
We will begin the review of empirical studies with ones that 
gave readers a task that almost certainly influenced the aspects 
of the text to which they paid attention. Rothkopf and 
Billington (1979) completed three experiments in which high 
school students memorized simple learning objectives before 
studying a 1,481 word passage on oceanography. Readers got 
either five or ten objectives, all stated in very specific terms 
and relevant to a single, readily identifiable sentence in the 
passage. For instance, one of the learning objectives w a s , What 
is the name of the scale used by oceanographers when recording 
the color of water? The test sentence that satisfied the 
objective w a s , Oceanographers record the color of the ocean by 
comparison with a series of bottles of colored water known as the 
Forel scale, the data confirmed that students who read with 
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objectives in mind spent more time on sentences relevant to these 
objectives and less time on ones not relevant to the objectives 
than did students who read without objectives. In the third 
experiment, patterns of eye movements were found to be consistent 
with the reading time results. In each study subjects learned 
and remembered substantially more information relevant to 
assigned objectives. These experiments produced exactly the 
results that would be expected on the basis of the selective 
attention hypothesis. 
Questions inserted in a text have been hypothesized to cause 
readers to pay more attention to information of the type the 
questions are about. Reynolds, Standiford, and Anderson (1979) 
investigated this hypothesis in an experiment in which college 
undergraduates were periodically questioned while they read a 48-
page marine biology text. The questions were of a clear and 
distinctive type. For instance, one group of readers received 
questions every four pages that could always be answered with a 
proper name. Other groups were asked questions that could always 
be answered with a technical term or a number. Time to read the 
text was recorded for every four-line segment. The main result 
of the experiment was that readers who answered questions spent 
more time on the segments of the text that contained information 
from the category needed to answer the questions. Performance on 
a later test showed that questioned groups learned and remembered 
more question-relevant information than the nonquestioned groups. 
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The results were entirely consistent with a simple selective 
attention theory. 
Several studies by Britton and his associates (cf. Britton, 
Piha, Davis, & Wehausen, 1978) have used the length of time 
before a secondary task is performed as a measure of the amount 
of attention being devoted to reading. Subjects were told that 
comprehending the text was their primary task. They were also 
given the "secondary task" of depressing a key whenever an 
auditory signal, or probe, was sounded. The idea behind this 
procedure is that when the mind is occupied with the primary task 
there will be a slight delay in responding to the secondary task. 
To explain this more fully, there is an upper limit to the amount 
of attention, or "cognitive capacity," that people can devote to 
a task. Ordinarily there is plenty of spare capacity when doing 
mental work such as reading. However, if a reader were to put 
substantial extra effort into a text element, this would place 
peak load demands on the cognitive system. Then there would be 
little capacity left over to process the probe and respond to it. 
Hence, the reaction to the probe would be delayed until capacity 
had been freed. 
Britton, Piha, Davis, and Wehausen (1978) and Reynolds and 
Anderson (1982) have employed the secondary task procedure to 
investigate whether periodic questions cause readers to 
selectively allocate attention. In the latter study college 
students again read the 48 page marine biology text. They were 
asked either a proper name question or a technical term question 
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every four pages. During each four-line text segment, the reader 
heard either zero, one, or two probes presented through 
earphones, at which points he or she was to push a key as quickly 
as possible. The results showed that readers took longer to 
respond to the probe when studying a segment that contained 
question-relevant information than when studying one that did 
not. Reading times were also longer on segments containing 
question-relevant information. Thus, using two different 
measures, this study supported the selective attention 
interpretation of the effects of questions. 
The selective attention hypothesis provides a parsimonious 
and convincing interpretation of the effects of equipping readers 
with instructional objectives or occasionally asking them 
questions. It is much more problematical, though, that the 
reader's schema acts primarily as a device for allocating 
attention. To assimilate the following vignette, it may be 
supposed that most readers would employ a WHO DONE IT schema. 
Detective Lieutenant Bill Roberts bent over the corpse. 
It was apparent the victim had been stabbed. Roberts 
searched the room looking for evidence. There near the foot 
of the bed, partly covered by a newspaper, he discovered the 
butcher knife. 
The question is whether extra cognitive capacity will be devoted 
to processing the important information expressed by "the butcher 
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knife." The selective attention hypothesis says yes. An 
alternative explanation is that the WHO DONE IT schema furnishes 
the "ideational scaffolding" (Ausubel, 1963; Anderson, Spiro, & 
Anderson, 1978) for the information in the text. Presumably the 
<murder weapon> occupies an important niche, or slot, in this 
structure. Furthermore, the second sentence of the text 
constrains the murder weapon to a sharp instrument. Thus, there 
is a slot established in the schema for which a knife is a 
leading candidate by the time the phrase, "the butcher knife," is 
encountered. As a consequence, according to the ideational 
scaffolding hypothesis, the information about the knife will be 
readily assimilated and there is no reason why it ought to 
require, or will receive, extra attention. 
Another alternative to the selective attention model 
outlined at the beginning of this section has been formulated by 
Kintsch and Van Dijk (1978). They theorized that important 
propositions are maintained in working memory throughout more 
processing "cycles" than less important ones. This is a kind of 
selective attention theory, since Kintsch and Van Dijk believe f 
that important propositions are more memorable because of the 
greater amount of processing they receive. However, the extra 
attention is not given when the proposition is encoded, but 
rather is said to come later when subsidiary propositions are 
being processed. 
Still another alternative hypothesis, as will be explained 
at length in the next section, is that the greater likelihood of 
A Schema-Theoretic View 44 
recall of important text elements may be attributable to a memory 
process rather than a learning process. This hypothesis, the 
ideational scaffolding hypothesis, and the Kintsch and Van Dijk 
multiple cycles hypothesis are all rivals to the simple selective 
attention hypothesis. Thus, the outcome of research on attention 
involving variations in schemata or text organization is not a 
foregone conclusion; and the results will be of genuine interest. 
G o e t z , Schallert, Reynolds and Radin (1983) examined the 
effects of the reader's perspective on the allocation of 
attention. Policeman, people in training to be real estate 
agents, and college students were instructed to take the 
perspective of a burglar, a person interested in buying a home, 
or no particular perspective while reading a story ostensibly 
about what two boys did at one of the boys homes while playing 
hooky from school. The research confirmed previous research that 
has established that the reader's perspective strongly influences 
which information will be recalled from this story (Pichert & 
Anderson, 1977; Anderson & Pichert, 1978; Grabe, 1979). Persons 
playing the role of a burglar are more likely to recall, for 
instance, that money is kept in a desk drawer, whereas those 
imagining themselves to be homebuyers more often reproduce, for 
example, the information that the place had spacious grounds. 
The new finding obtained by Goetz and his colleagues is that 
subjects spent more time reading sentences that contained 
information important in the light of the schema activated by 
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perspective instructions» They also spent somewhat more time on 
sentences important in the light of their background. For 
instance, the policemen took longer to read sentences containing 
information important to burglars than the other subjects. 
Reynolds (1981) and Anderson (1982) have summarized research 
consistent with these findings. 
Cirilo and Foss (1980) have reported two experiments in 
which time to read sentences was assessed when the sentences were 
of high importance in one story and low importance in another. 
The sentence, He could no longer talk at all, was highly 
*' 
important in a story in which it described the effect of a 
witch's curse on a wise king. The same sentence was of low 
importance in a story in which it described the momentary 
reaction of a simple soldier upon hearing that he would receive a 
large reward for finding a precious ring. In two experiments 
Cirilo and Foss found that readers spent more time on a sentence 
when it played an important role in a story. 
Britton, Meyer, Simpson, Holdredge, and Curry (1979) have 
recently reported another test of the selective attention 
hypothesis. The materials included two expository texts 
involving the energy crisis. In one, according to Meyer's (1975) 
analysis, a paragraph on the breeder reactor was high in the 
content structure; the passage said the fast breeder reactor is 
the solution to energy problems. In the context of the other 
passage, the paragraph was low in the content structure; the 
breeder reactor is only one of five possible solutions to the 
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energy crisis. Subjects recalled more information from the 
critical paragraph when it was of high importance. However, they 
took the same amount of time to read the critical paragraph and 
the same amount of time to react to a secondary task probe 
regardless of the paragraph's importance. Hence, the selective 
attention hypothesis was not confirmed. Britton and his 
collaborators theorized that the superior recall of the critical 
paragraph when it was of higher importance was due to a memory 
process. 
We don't know how to reconcile the conflicting results 
obtained by Cirilo and Foss (1980) and in our own research, on 
the one hand, and Britton et al. (1979), on the other. There 
were several differences in materials and procedures. Most 
notably there were different definitions of what makes a text 
element "important." It is apparent that one ought to be 
cautious in assuming that any single operation that can be said 
to make a segment of text salient, interesting, or important will 
affect processing in the same manner (see Anderson, 1982). An 
important task facing the field of reading research is a further 
explication of the notion of "importance." 
Improvements in the simple, first-order theory of selective 
attention will be required before the theory can cope with the 
demands of texts of any complexity. For instance, readers often 
will be unable to gauge the importance of elements when first 
encountered. Indeed, in some literary forms, such as short 
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stories and the detective novels, innocuous happenings frequently 
turn out to be significant at some later point. 
What "fix-up strategy" (Alessi, Anderson, & Goetz, 1979) 
could readers use for dealing with text information whose 
significance was not initially appreciated? If the information 
were available in memory, perhaps in fragmentary and 
unassimilated form, it could simply be retrieved and processed 
further at the point at which its importance was discovered. If 
the information were not in memory, the reader could look back 
and reread the relevant section of the text. Efficient use of 
"look backs" (Alessi, Anderson & Goetz, 1979) would require the 
person to know where in the text the information could be found. 
Rothkopf (1971) has discovered that readers incidentally acquire 
a surprising amount of information about the geography of a text. 
Though they had not been forewarned that they would be asked 
where information was located, after reading a 3000-word passage 
people were able to report the page on which information 
appeared, and even the location within the page, with much better 
than chairce accuracy. 
A fundamental question is why an extra allocation of 
cognitive capacity ought to be facilitative. Some would simply 
take it as axiomatic that attention is the precursor to learning, 
and let the argument rest there (cf. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Our view is that ultimately this is 
not a satisfying level of explanation. A complete theory will 
require an analysis of what readers are doing with the cognitive 
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capacity they invest. They could be rehearsing selected segments 
of the text in the traditional sense of implicitly repeating the 
segments to themselves, as an actor learning his lines does. 
Rehearsal appears to be the operation that Rothkopf and 
Billington (1979) had in mind as the explanation for the effects 
of learning objectives. Another view is that readers pay extra 
attention to certain text segments in order to process them at a 
semantically deeper level. A problem with the depth-of-
processing notion is that a semantic level of representation is 
required before a reader could have a basis for determining that 
a segment was important enough to deserve more attention. At 
this point the reader might engage in still "deeper" processing, 
but no one has been able to say exactly what that could mean, as 
critics of the idea have noted (Nelson, 1977; Baddeley, 1978). 
In any event, Craik and his associates, who introduced the phrase 
"depth of processing" (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), have abandoned 
the concept. He and his colleagues now speak in terms of the 
"elaboration" of to-be-learned material (Craik & Tulving, 1975) 
and the "distinctiveness" of the encoded representation (Jacoby, 
C r a i k , & Begg, 1979). 
Our conjecture is that extra attention is invested in 
important propositions in a text in order to connect these 
propositions with the overall representation that is being 
constructed. So, if a person pretending to be a burglar reads 
that coins are kept in a desk drawer, the connection is made that 
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the coins are potential loot and what a burglar is interested in 
is loot. Drawing such connecting inferences requires cognitive 
capacity. The fact that they are drawn is the reason, or part of 
the reason, for the superior recall of important text elements. 
When a person is studying a t e x t — t h a t is, reading with the 
deliberate intention of learning ideas and i n f o r m a t i o n — s o m e form 
of the selective attention hypothesis would appear to give a 
highly plausible account of aspects of the reader's processing 
activities (see T . H. Anderson, 1979). However, as a 
characterization of the activity of a person who is simply 
reading, the hypothesis has much less a_ priori appeal. We would 
not be surprised to find no evidence of differential allocation 
of capacity on the part of an individual engrossed with the 
sports page or curled up with a novel. Such learning of 
information as takes place under these conditions is the 
incidental by-product of comprehension. The demand 
characteristics of laboratory experiments on discourse processes 
put subjects more in the mode of studying than simply reading. 
Direct, systematic study of what is happening when people are 
simply reading will not be easy, since procedures for the real-
time measurement of attention are especially intrusive. 
A complete theory of the allocation of attention during 
reading will have to take account of all major demands on 
cognitive capacity. Included is the capacity needed to analyze 
words and access their meanings, to parse sentences into 
constituents, and to construct propositions. Many aspects of 
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reading may be automatic, at least in the skilled reader, and 
hence require very little cognitive capacity (LaBerge & Samuels, 
1974; Posner, 1978). Nevertheless, as a general rule, it is 
probably a safe bet that every level of linguistic analysis 
requires some attention. Even highly overlearned, largely 
habitual operations must be monitored because of occasional 
breakdowns. 
Graesser, Hoffman, and Clark (1980) and Just & Carpenter 
(1980) have demonstrated that a range of language processing 
operations do require cognitive capacity. In the former study, 
reading times were collected for 275 sentences in 12 passages. 
The sentences were analyzed in terms of three variables believed 
to relate to the text m a c r o s t r u c t u r e — t h a t is, the 
interrelationships among sentences and the organization of the 
passage as a whole. There were also three variables related to 
the microstructure, or linguistic units within sentences. 
Reading time was strongly influenced by macrostructure variables, 
especially whether the sentence was from a story or expository 
text, but also by the familiarity of the topic (see Steffensen, 
Joag-dev, & Anderson, 1979), and by the amount of new information 
in the sentence. The microstructure variables had smaller but 
still significant effects on overall reading time. When subjects 
were split into groups of fast and slow readers, there was no 
difference between groups on macrostructure components, but a 
substantial difference with respect to microstructure variables. 
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The cost in time to process an additional word or proposition or 
cope with unpredictable syntax was much greater for slow than 
fast readers* Graesser and colleagues went on to show that 
readers instructed to prepare for an essay, in contrast to a 
multiple-choice, examination devoted increasing amounts of time 
to difficult macrostructure components of the texts, whereas time 
to process microstructure components did not vary. This is a 
reasonable result since an essay exam requires an organized 
understanding of a text. Multiple-choice questions can be 
answered from a piecemeal representation. 
In summary, despite some inconsistent findings and several 
unanswered questions, based on the evidence available at this 
time, the selective attention hypothesis looks promising. 
Schemata and Remembering 
Thus far we have dealt with processes supported by the 
person's schema when a message is being comprehended and aspects 
of its content learned. In this section we turn to the influence 
of schemata on processes that may be at work later when the 
information and ideas in the message are being remembered and 
used. 
Much research that is ostensibly about remembering is really 
about comprehension and learning. In such research, the 
operational measure is recall, which seems to implicate memory, 
but in fact the measure is collected in order to make inferences 
about earlier processes that are not directly observable. Such 
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research rests on the assumption that what gets stored is the 
major determiner of what can be remembered. Notice, however, 
that if learning entirely determines remembering, then 
remembering is an uninteresting, derivative process. Loosely 
speaking, any factor that affects performance on a recall test 
can be said to affect remembering. In a serious discussion, 
though, a result should not be attributed to remembering unless 
there is an effect above and beyond that which can be explained 
in terms of learning. 
Pichert and Anderson (1977) obtained evidence which 
suggested that a person's schema has an effect on memory in 
addition to an effect on learning. Subjects read the passage 
already described about what two boys did at one of the boys' 
homes while skipping school, or they read a passage about two 
gulls frolicking over a remote island. Readers' schemata were 
manipulated by assigning different perspectives. For the boys-
playing-hooky-from-school passage, one third of the subjects were 
instructed to read the story from the perspective of a potential 
homebuyer, one third were to read it from the perspective of a 
burglar, and one third, a control group, were given no special 
perspective. For the gulls-frolicking-over-an-island story, one 
third of the subjects were told to take the perspective of an 
eccentric florist who desired a remote place to raise exotic 
flowers, one third were to read the story from the perspective of 
a shipwrecked person eager to stay alive and get home, and one 
third were controls. 
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The passages were written so as to contain information of 
contrasting importance to the perspectives. For instance, the 
passage ostensibly about two boys playing hooky from school 
contained the information that the house had a leaky roof, which 
would be important to a real estate prospect but not a burglar, 
and the information that the family had a large color TV set, 
where the reverse would be true. 
Subjects were asked to recall the passage shortly after 
reading and a week later. Table 1, which is reprinted from the 
Pichert and Anderson paper, summarizes the results. As can be 
seen, the importance of the information to the assigned 
perspective had a powerful influence on learning and also a 
positive, though small, influence on memory after one week. The 
index of memory was the proportion of information recalled given 
that the same information had also been recalled on the first 
test shortly after reading a week earlier. This index is 
logically independent of level of recall on the first test. If 
the first test is regarded as representing level of learning, 
then the experiment provides evidence that a person's schema has 
separate effects on learning and memory. 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
This interpretation is open to challenge, however. It could 
be argued that the schema operative when a person is reading has 
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an influence on learning that is not manifested in an immediate 
opportunity to recall. Text elements that are important in the 
light of the reader's schema might be overlearned because they 
receive more processing or deeper processing. As a result, these 
elements may have enough strength to appear at both immediate and 
delayed recall. On the other hand, a larger proportion of the 
less well learned, unimportant elements may be above a recall 
threshold when the first test is given but below the threshold a 
week later. 
Anderson and Pichert (1978) attempted to design a test of 
the effects of schemata on memory that would be free from 
possible latent effects of level of learning. Subjects read the 
boys-playing-hooky-from-school passage from one of the two 
perspectives, recalled the passage for a first time, changed 
p e r s p e c t i v e s — f r o m homebuyer to burglar, or vice versa, and then 
recalled the passage for a second time. The data showed that 
people recalled additional, previously unrecalled information 
following the shift in perspective. There was a significant 
increase in recall of information important to the new 
perspective but unimportant to the one operative when the passage 
was read. It is impossible to explain this result in terms of a 
learning process since the switch of perspectives occurred after 
the material had been read and recalled once. The phenomenon 
must be attributed to a remembering process. 
The finding that a change of perspective leads to an 
increment in recall of information important to the new 
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perspective, and also a decrement in recall of information 
unimportant to the new perspective, has been replicated a number 
of times under several variations of design and procedure. For 
example, Anderson, Pichert, and Shirey (1983) asked high school 
students to read a passage and recall it just once, either from 
the perspective operative during reading or a different 
perspective assigned prior to recall. Table 2 contains the 
results. As can be seen, there were independent effects of the 
reading perspective and the recall perspective on recall. The 
data plainly show that the schemata brought into place by 
perspective instructions affect both learning and remembering. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
In a second experiment, Anderson, Pichert, and Shirey found 
that a new perspective had lost most of its power to reinstate 
previously unrecalled text information after an interval of a 
w e e k . Similarly, Foss and Schumacher (1981) reported a 
diminished perspective shift effect after an interval of twenty 
four hours. On the other hand, Flammer and Tauber (1982), in a 
study involving German-speaking Swiss university students, found 
only slightly reduced recall of information important in the 
light of the new perspective when the perspective was assigned 
twenty minutes after reading. Evidently unassimilated bits and 
pieces of information in the recesses of the mind will be 
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irretrievably lost unless a complementary schema is introduced 
within a fairly short period after reading. 
Exactly how does a person's schema influence remembering? 
In previous papers (e.g., Anderson, 1978), we have outlined three 
possible answers to this question, which we labeled the retrieval 
plan hypothesis, the output editing hypothesis, and the 
reconstruction hypothesis. 
According to the retrieval plan hypothesis the schema 
provides the framework for a "top-down" (Norman & Bobrow, 1975) 
search of memory. The idea is that search proceeds from the 
general concepts incorporated in the schema to the particular 
information related to these concepts that was learned while the 
passage was being read. According to the theory, a top-down, 
schema-guided search provides access to information important in 
the light of the schema, but it cannot turn up information 
unrelated to the schema. 
The retrieval plan hypothesis can be illustrated with 
reference to the burglar perspective on the hooky passage. Most 
peoples' BURGLARY schema will include the general concepts of 
entering the premises to be robbed, trying to avoid detection, 
finding objects that qualify as l o o t — n a m e l y , valuable objects 
that are easily moved and readily fenced, and making a clean 
getaway. The statement in the passage that the side door to the 
house is kept unlocked is likely to be made accessible when the 
general need of burglars to enter the premises is considered. 
The statement that tall trees hid the house from the road is a 
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candidate for reinstatement by the AVOIDING DETECTION subschema. 
Similarly, various objects mentioned in the story, such as the 
color TV set and money in the desk in the den, are likely to 
occur to the rememberer when he thinks about loot. The general 
point is that, by reviewing his knowledge of what is true of most 
burglaries, the rememberer is reminded of the burglar-relevant 
information in the passage. Though the processes of remembering 
are not necessarily deliberate or conscious, a useful way to 
think about the retrieval plan hypothesis is that the schema 
provides the rememberer with an outline of the questions he ought 
to ask himself. 
A second possible hypothesis to explain effects on 
remembering is that the schema provides the basis and the 
motivation for output editing. By "output editing" we mean 
selection/rejection of information to report when recalling a 
passage. The hypothesis says that the criteria for this decision 
favor the currently operative schema. If a piece of information 
is relevant to his schema, a person might be willing to report it 
even though he is uncertain of his recollection. On the other 
hand, the person might impose high standards of certainty for 
evaluating information not relevant to his schema. The pattern 
of results that involves increased recall of important 
information and decreased recall of unimportant information could 
be explained in terms of perspective-induced shifts in standards 
for output editing. 
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* A third hypothesis is that the rememberer
f
s schema 
facilitates reconstruction. According to this hypothesis the 
person generates inferences about what must have been in the 
passage based on his schema and aspects of the passage that can 
be recalled. For instance, a person attempting to recall the 
hooky passage from the perspective of a burglar will surely 
recall that the narrative involved an affluent, middle-class 
family. Knowing the life style and spending habits of persons in 
this social stratum and the concern of a burglar with valuable, 
portable, fencible items, it may occur to the rememberer that the 
passage mentioned one or another small appliance such as a food 
processer, color T V , camera, chain saw, sewing machine, or 
stereo. As a matter of fact, among these items only a color TV 
is mentioned. However, a person's degree of conviction that he 
"read" about a particular appliance may relate not only to 
whether the item was actually there, but also to such factors as 
the likelihood that a family of this type would have such an 
appliance and whether that appliance is typically part of a 
burglar's loot. Thus, a person might be fairly certain that he 
read about a stereo, even though none was mentioned. As Spiro 
(1977) has noted, a similar process could produce instances of 
correct recall. Suppose a person did not actually remember the 
information about the color TV set. He might infer its existence 
anyway, and become convinced that he read about it because of the 
high likelihood of a color TV set in well-to-do-households. In 
this fashion, an inventive person with a slack criterion for 
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output editing may be able to "remember" additional information 
from a text as well as produce fabrications (cf. Gauld & 
Stephenson, 1967). 
Next we will consider the evidence that bears on the 
mechanisms by which a schema affects remembering. The simplest 
and least interesting explanation is provided by the output 
editing hypothesis. Indeed, one may wonder whether a change in 
criterion ought to be called a memory process. 
Several studies have examined the output editing hypothesis. 
Surber (1977) varied the incentive for recall. He reasoned that 
if the increment in recall observed among people who shift to a 
new perspective were due to the adoption of a lax criterion, then 
the increment would disappear under conditions of high incentive, 
because then presumably everybody would apply a lax criterion. 
The results showed a difference in recall in favor of people who 
shifted perspective regardless of whether a $.25 bonus was paid 
for each new idea. 
Anderson and Pichert (1978) used a direct approach to see 
whether output editing was a creditable hypothesis. They 
interviewed subjects who had recalled a passage for the second 
time after changing perspectives. Nine of twelve subjects 
insisted that each time they recalled the passage they wrote down 
everything they could remember whether important or unimportant. 
In the words of one of them, "I tried to write down everything 
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even if it seemed stupid, you know. I generally wrote what I 
could remember." 
Two unpublished experiments by Anderson, Shirey, and Pichert 
have assessed the output editing hypothesis using recognition 
memory. For one experiment, alternate versions of the boys-
playing-hooky passage were written that contained different but 
comparable information of roughly equal attractiveness to 
burglars or to real estate prospects. For instance, a piece of 
information relevant to homebuyers was a damaged ceiling due to a 
leaky roof. The comparable information in the other version was 
a crack in a wall due to a settling foundation. In this 
experiment half of the subjects read one of the versions of the 
passage, half read the other, and later everyone took a test 
based on information from both versions. The test required 
subjects to evaluate whether or not each of a series of sentences 
expressed a proposition that they had read. According to the 
output editing hypothesis people will apply a lenient criterion 
for evaluating items expressing information relevant to their 
perspective. As a consequence, they will tend to accept 
perspective-relevant items they have not actually seen. In the 
case being used for illustration, a person given the homebuyer 
perspective would be expected to accept both the item about the 
settling foundation and the one about the leaky roof. This did 
not happen. Indeed, neither reading perspective nor recall 
perspective had any discernible effect on recognition memory It 
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two large experiments using somewhat different materials and 
procedures. 
Presumably people can and do evaluate what they are saying 
according to criteria of relevance and veracity, and presumably 
these criteria change according to circumstances. Nonetheless, 
based on the accumulated evidence, it seems safe to conclude that 
output editing is not responsible for the changes in recall of 
passages that have been observed when people shift perspectives, 
at least under the conditions that have prevailed in the 
experiments reviewed in this paper* 
The retrieval plan hypothesis is able to explain why 
perspective instructions have consistent effects on recall but no 
apparent effects on recognition* A recognition test item 
minimizes the need for retrieving information from memory since 
the information is provided in the item itself. The essence of 
the retrieval plan hypothesis is that the schema is a structure
 f 
that provides access to information in memory. Since access is 
not a problem on recognition items, the retrieval plan hypothesis 
predicts no effect. Access is a critical process in free recall, 
so large effects are predicted there. Intermediate effects would 
be expected on a cued recall test that provided some guidance but 
did not eliminate the need for retrieval. 
Anderson and Pichert (1978) obtained interview protocols 
that supported the notion of using a schema as the basis for a 
retrieval plan. The interviewer probed to determine why subjects 
thought they had come up with new information the second time 
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they recalled a passage. Seven of the sixteen subjects expressly 
stated that considering categories of information which were 
significant in the light of the perspective caused them to recall 
additional items of information from these categories. For 
instance, one subject who shifted from the homebuyer to the 
burglar perspective said, 
I just thought of myself as a burglar walking through 
the house. So I had a different point of view, a different 
objective point of view for different details, you k n o w . I 
noticed the door was open, and where would I go here, go 
there, take this, take that, what rooms would I go to and 
what rooms wouldn't I go to. Like, you know, who cares 
about the outside and stuff? You can't steal a wall or 
nothing . . . I remembered [the color TV] in the second one, 
# 
but not in the first one. I was thinking about things to 
steal, things you could take and steal. In the den was the 
money. China, jewelry, other stuff in other places. [Q: 
Why do you think you remembered the color TV the second time 
and not the first time?] Because I was thinking of things 
to steal, I guess. 
Six other subjects, who were less explicit about recall 
strategies, said that the new perspective "jogged" their memories 
or that when given the new perspective additional information 
"popped" into their heads. Hence, in all, thirteen of sixteen 
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subjects made statements consistent with the retrieval plan 
hypothesis, 
A subtle prediction that can be made based on the retrieval 
plan hypothesis is that rememberers ought to recall information 
in conceptually related clusters. The hypothesis asserts that 
memory search is organized in terms of the general categories 
that comprise the schema. So, for instance, a person pretending 
to be a homebuyer might be expected to recall, one after another, 
several defects of the house that were discussed at locations 
scattered across the passage. We have failed to find much 
clustering in informal analyses of attempts to recall the hooky 
passage. One reason for this may be that the assigned 
perspective is not the only schema subjects are using to organize 
recall. Two other schemata that come into play involve the 
spatial organization of the house and the temporal organization 
of the plot, such as it is, involving the two boys. These 
supplementary schemata may tend to minimize clustering in terms 
of burglar or homebuyers concerns. 
Grabe (1979) has also investigated the role of schemata in 
recall organization. He used the boys-playing-hooky-passage and 
a passage about a nursery school which was recalled from the 
* 
perspective of either a toy manufacturer or a child psychologist. 
Clustering was significantly greater among subjects assigned 
perspectives than among no-perspective control subjects, largely 
because of the strong results obtained with the nursery school 
material. In Grabe's (1979) study, the perspective was assigned 
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before the passage was read, and so it can be assumed that it 
provided the framework for learning as well as remembering. A 
worthwhile project would be to see if recall organization changes 
when the perspective shifts after reading. 
In summary, the retrieval plan hypothesis gives a good 
account of several different kinds of data. It remains a 
plausible candidate to explain some of the effects of schemata on 
remembering. 
There is a substantial research literature bearing on the 
inferential reconstruction hypothesis. We will consider here 
only studies that provide a clear basis for distinguishing 
between memory effects and effects attributable to the 
representation built up when a message was initially interpreted. 
A memory effect must be involved when a person acquires a certain 
perspective after reading a message, as was the case in the 
research of Spiro (1977; 1980) and Snyder and Uranowitz (1978). 
In the latter study people read a case history of a woman 
named Betty K . Later some subjects were informed that Betty K . 
was living a lesbian lifestyle while others were told she was a 
heterosexual. Although subjects were told that they were being 
tested for accuracy of memory for factual information in the case 
history, answers to a multiple choice test indicated selective 
remembering of information that supported their current 
interpretation of Betty K's sexuality and also distortion of 
information that contradicted their current view. For example 
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subjects who were informed that Betty K . was a lesbian said she 
never went out with boys during high school whereas some subjects 
given the information that she was heterosexual said she had a 
steady boyfriend. The correct answer was that she occasionally 
dated boys. 
Loftus and her colleagues have done some especially 
provocative research on reconstructive memory (cf. Loftus, 1980). 
In one study (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) people saw a film of an 
automobile accident and then answered questions about what they 
had seen. The question, "About how fast were the cars going when 
they smashed into each other?" elicited a higher estimate of 
speed than questions that used verbs such as bumped or hit in 
place of smashed. On a test administered one week, later, those 
subjects who had heard the verb smashed were more likely to 
answer "yes" to the question, Did you see any broken glass? even 
though broken glass was not present in the film. This experiment 
and many others using similar procedures show that related 
information is usually assimilated into a single schema, with the 
frequent result that people are unable to distinguish between 
information with a direct basis in experience and that which was 
not actually experienced but which is consistent with the schema. 
Several studies show that the longer the interval between 
reading and recall the larger the effects of the reader's schema. 
A remembering process is implicated, therefore, rather than a 
learning process because the effects of a learning process would 
be strongest immediately following a passage and would diminish 
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thereafter. The schema manifests itself as an increase with time 
in the frequency of schema-consistent distortions in free recall 
(Bartlett, 1932) or in susceptibility to schema-consistent foils 
in recognition (Sulin & Dooling, 1974). This phenomenon is 
nicely illustrated in a study by Read and Rossen (1981). They 
asked people who were either strongly for or strongly against 
nuclear power to read a text about a fire at a nuclear power 
plant. The data revealed very little effect on a multiple-choice 
test given immediately after the story. However, when the test 
was given one or two weeks later, there was a substantial degree 
of acceptance of belief-consistent distortions of the original 
information. Subjects who were personally opposed to nuclear 
power correctly rejected spurious, pro-nuclear statements; 
however, they tended to accept incorrect anti-nuclear statements. 
Subjects who favored nuclear power produced the opposite pattern 
of results. 
There have been studies that have failed to support a 
reconstructive view of memory (cf. Greenwald & Sokomura, 1967; 
Brigham & Cook, 1969). In general, these studies have used 
arbitrary, disconnected material, have involved reading this 
material in an unnatural manner, or have given the test 
immediately after the material was exposed. Conversely, when 
people read life-like prose in a normal manner such that their 
knowledge and belief about the world is actually engaged, and 
when the test is delayed for more than a few moments, typically 
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the results strongly support the reconstructive hypothesis 
(Spiro, 1977; Sheppard, 1980; Read & Rosen, 1981). 
In summary, available data support the ideas that the 
reader's schema is a structure that facilitates planful retrieval 
of text information from memory and permits recontruction of 
elements that were not learned or have been forgotten. 
Future Directions for Research in Comprehension 
In our judgment, Huey would have been delighted with the 
progress that reading research has made in unraveling "the 
tangled story of the most remarkable specific performance that 
civilization has learned in all its history." It is true, of 
course, that there are gaps in understanding and alternative 
explanations of phenomena for which the available evidence 
provides no resolution. Thus, there is still much work to be 
done in order to build THE definitive model of basic processes in 
reading comprehension. 
We close by discussing some of the implications that basic 
research in comprehension holds for educational research and 
practice (see also the thoughtful review of research on 
comprehension instruction by Tierney and Cunningham (in press)). 
These ideas are offered in the spirit of conjecture, as 
hypotheses in need of elaboration and explication, and in need of 
testing in the laboratory and in the classroom. 
^ First, poor readers are likely to have gaps in knowledge. » 
Since what a person already knows is aprincipal determiner of 
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what she can comprehend, the less she knows the less she can 
comprehend. 
Second, poor readers are likely to have an impoverished 
understanding of the relationships among the facts they do know 
about a topic. Arbitrary information is a source of confusion, 
slow learning, slow processing, and unsatisfactory reasoning. 
Third, poor readers are unlikely to make the inferences 
required to weave the information given in a text into a coherent 
overall representation. Poor readers do not seem to consistently 
appreciate t h a t — u s i n g the analogy of Wilson and Anderson (in 
press)—comprehending a story or text is like completing a jig 
saw puzzle:^ All of the information must be used; the information 
must fit into place without forcing; all of the important slots 
must contain information; and the completed interpretation must 
make sense. Forming a coherent representation requires drawing 
precise, integrating inferences, and drawing such inferences is 
not something poor readers do routinely and spontaneously (see 
Bransford, Stein, N y e , Franks, Auble, Mezynski, & Perfetto, 1982, 
and the companion articles). 
If the foregoing problems have been accurately identified 
and they are the central ones, then plausible solutions naturally 
suggest themselves: Becoming a good reader demands a curriculum 
rich with concepts from the everyday world and learned fields of 
study. Becoming a good reader requires books that explain how 
and why things function as they do. Becoming a good reader 
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depends upon teachers who insist that students think about the 
interconnections among ideas as they read. 
We hope that these conjectures provide impetus for 
instructional researchers to conduct the kind of painstaking 
classroom and materials research necessary to build and validate 
better programs of comprehension instruction and for educators to 
begin to develop and evaluate instructional programs that will 
lead to the literate citizenry our future will demand. 
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Table 1 
Mean Proportion Recalled as a Function 
of Idea Unit Importance 
Idea Unit Importance 
High Medium Low 
Learning** .48 .36 .25 
Memory
0 
.68 .65 .53 
Coded according to the perspective operative while the 
passage was read. 
^Proportion of idea units recalled on immediate test. 
c 
Proportion of idea units recalled on delayed test given 
recall on immediate test. 
Table 2 
Mean Proportions of Text Elements Recalled 
Importance to 










Figure 1, A ship christening schema. 
Figure 2. Some additional components of a ship christening schema. 
Figure 3. After Allan M. Collins & M. Ross Quillian, "Retrieval 
time from semantic memory,
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